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Syria is not the main priority of Russia’s foreign policy, however, it remains 
the crucial partner in the Middle East, being Moscow’s anchor in the region. That 
was true during the Cold War and remains true today. If we want to locate Syria in 
a concentric circles scheme of contemporary Russia’s foreign policy, we should 
put it into the third one – the intercontinental circle. This covers not only the Asia 
and Pacific region but also the Middle East, and so Syria1. Syria’s importance has 
increased in recent years for numerous reasons due to the ongoing destabilization 
of Syria and increased activity of so-called Islamic State (IS). 
The aim of this article is to analyze the determinants and goals of Russia’s 
foreign policy towards Syria and attempt to answer the question of the causes and 
interests that underlie Russia’s involvement there on the side of Bashar al-Assad. 
1 A. Bryc, Cele polityki zagranicznej Federacji Rosyjskiej, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 
Toruń 2005, p. 10.
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1. THE MIDDLE EAST AS A REGION OF TRADITIONAL  
ruSSian actiVity
Syria became a crucial partner of the USSR in the 1970s, after the regime 
change in Egypt and the reorientation of that country’s foreign policy. The more 
pro-Soviet Gamal Nasser was replaced by a more pro-Western Anwar al-Sadat. 
The Soviet-Syrian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, signed on October 8, 
1980, was one of the results of the rapprochement between Moscow and Damas-
cus at that time. It provided for consultation in case of a threat to peace and for mil-
itary cooperation. Nine years earlier Moscow had leased port facilities in Tartus. 
The year 1991 changed the situation. After the dissolution of the USSR, the 
Russian Federation (RF) faced numerous external and internal problems. These 
included the deterioration of the economic, social and political situation, demise 
of the international position of Russia, and destabilization of the post-Soviet 
space. Therefore, the RF had to concentrate on internal matters and its neigh-
bourhood, reducing its activity in regions that had been important during Soviet 
times. Moscow conceded gave an inch to the West in the Middle East and on the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process not only because of its weakness, but also due to 
the prioritization of the Western focus in Russia’s foreign policy at the beginning 
of the 1990s. However, the “honeymoon” in relations between Russia and the 
West only lasted a few years. Russia grew disappointed with Western policy and 
attitude towards Russia, that was not, according to Moscow, treated as an equal 
partner. The enlargement policy of NATO and its involvement in the Balkan wars 
caused the evolution of Russia’s foreign policy. In 1996 after Evgenii Primakov’s 
appointment as the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia became more 
assertive towards Western countries and more active in the regions of Moscow’s 
traditional activity. These include the Middle East, especially Iran, Iraq and Syria. 
The rapprochement between Damascus and Moscow was more apparent after the 
2003 American intervention in Iraq. Since then, the Kremlin began to play the 
role the protector of the Shi’a Alawite minority, Assad’s protector and diplomatic 
shield2. Bilateral relations strengthened even more after the Vladimir Putin and 
Bashar al-Assad meeting in Moscow in 2005. The leaders agreed to reduce the 
Syrian debt ($13,4 billion) by 73 percent, to $3,6 billion3, an agreement that al-
lowed Syria to purchase large amount of Russian weaponry.
2 A. Bryc, Rosja w XXI wieku. Gracz światowy czy koniec gry?, WAiP, Warszawa 2008, 
p. 199.
3 R.H. Donaldson, J.L. Nogee and V. Nadkarni, The Foreign Policy of Russia. Changing 
Systems, Enduring Interests, Routledge, London and New York 2014, p. 329.
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2. DETERMINANTS OF RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SYRIA
2.1. GEOGRAPHIC PROxIMITY AND THE ISLAMIC FACTOR
The geographic proximity of the turbulent Middle East to the North and South 
Caucasus and to Central Asia remains one of determinants of Russia’s policy 
towards Syria. It cannot be forgotten that from Damascus to Makhachkala in Dag-
estan is only about 1,600 kilometres. It is not so far if we take into consideration 
existing links between jihadists from the Middle East and the Caucasus. Links 
between the North Caucasus inhabitants and the Arab world are also sustained by 
the Chechen and Cherkessia diasporas living in Syria and Jordan. 
It is significant, moreover, that the Caucasus is one of the most unstable re-
gions in post-Soviet space. The currently stable situation in Chechnya is sustained 
mainly by the “chechenization policy” adopted in 2000/20014 and antiterrorist 
operations conducted before the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi. According to 
John Russell, “chechenization” is “the indigenization within a Russian vertical of 
power by picking an authoritarian Chechen leader to nullify the separatist threat 
“5. In other words, it is based on the principle of internal independence and stabili-
zation in exchange for huge and regular financial support from the federal budget. 
Nevertheless, the propensity for radicalization and Islamic fundamentalism among 
Muslim nations and ethnic groups inhabiting the North Caucasus is still present6. 
Growing radicalization has been observed among young Muslims, especially from 
Chechnya and Dagestan, who are recruited by “IS” and other jihadist groups. 
Russia’s Federal Security Service declared last year that the number of Russian 
citizens fighting with “IS” rose from 1,700 to 2,400 between February September 
20157. In October, Vladimir Putin estimated that the number of former Soviet 
republic citizens who had decided to join “IS” was about 7,0008. Sunni Muslims 
4 Policy toward Chechnya conducted by federal authorities. It was adopted in 2001 and it 
was based on agreement between Ahmad Kadyrov (father of present president of Chechnya) and 
Vladimir Putin. Policy involved co-opting (buying off) Chechen leaders and ultimately transfer-
ring the conflict from Russian to Chechen hands. M. Matejova, “Russian “Chechenization” and the 
Prospects for a Lasting Peace in Chechnya”, International Journal On World Peace, June 2013, 
Vol. xxx, No. 2, p. 9. 
5 J. Russell, “Ramzan Kadyrov: The Indigenous Key to Success in Putin’s Chechenization 
Strategy?”, Nationalities Papers, August 2008, p. 661. See: M. Falkowski, “Ramzanistan. Rus-
sian’s Chechen Problem”, Point of View, August 2015, Number 54. 
6 20–30 millions of Russian citizens are Muslims, which is about 15–20 percent of Russian 
population. They inhabit southern parts of the Russian Federation – mentioned above Dagestan and 
Chechnya, but also Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Stavropolskiy Kray.
7 K. Hille, “Russia and radicalisation: Homegrown problem”, Financial Times, 07.12.2015, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/77156ed2-9ab0-11e5-be4f-0abd1978acaa.html#axzz3tjakxmgO 
[accessed: 07.12.2015].
8 R. Oliphat, “Vladimir Putin announces Russia-led Central Asian military force”, The Tele-
graph, 16.10.2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11937195/Vladimir-
Putin-announces-Russia-led-Central-Asian-military-force.html [accessed: 14.08.2016]. M.N. Katz, 
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from Russia and from the other post-Soviet states did not fight in Libya, where 
both sides were Sunni, but a different situation occurs in Syria.
In November 2014 a short movie with warnings to the Kremlin that Chechnya 
and Dagestan would be soon liberated appeared on the Internet. A similar but more 
professional the “IS” propaganda movie appeared on the Internet in November 
2015. In that short film, Russia was included in the anti- “IS” coalition and was 
warned that it was going to be attacked and destroyed. The growing Islamization 
and revival of radicalization among Chechen, Ingush, Cherkees, and Dagestan 
peoples were linked to some extent with their engagement in Syria and Iraq on the 
“IS” side. It certainly poses a serious threat for Russia. Probably this is one of the 
reasons why Russia decided to intervene in Syria in October 2015. It is definitely 
safer for Moscow to eliminate North Caucasian fighters outside of Russian territory. 
The problem of radicalization in the post-Soviet societies concerns not only 
the North Caucasus inhabitants, but also Uzbeks, Kyrgyz and Tajiks. Many of 
them, as it turns out, are radicalised and recruited during their presence in Russia 
as migrant workers. They are in a new and rather unfriendly environment, far from 
local communities which make them more secure and give a source of identity. 
The latter very often is changed abroad to a Muslim one. 
2.2. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY TIES
Economic relations between Russia and Syria are strong. Since 2000 the vol-
ume of trade between the two countries has been gradually growing and by 2012 
reached $2 billion9. In 2014 Russia was Syria’s tenth largest trade partner (after 
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, China 
and the European Union)10. The growth in trade correlates, to some degree, with 
restructuring of Syria’s debt to the USSR ($13,4 billion) and its partial exchange 
of new contracts for Russian companies, mostly in energy and infrastructure 
sector11. Nevertheless, Middle Eastern countries, are not as important economic 
partners for Russia as European or the Far Eastern countries. Instability in the 
Middle East and rather pessimistic prospects are not promising for improving 
economic cooperation and trade with the region. The situation in the mid-term 
perspective is unlikely to change.
“Moscow and the Middle East: repeat performance?”, Russia in Global Affairs, July – September 
2012, No. 3, p. 4.
9 N. Kozhanov, “Russian-Syrian Dialogue: Myths and Realities”, Journal of the Middle East 
and Africa 2014, Vol. 5, Is. 1, p. 3; N.K. Gvosdev, Ch. Marsh, Russian Foreign Policy. Interests, Vec-
tors, and Sectors, SAGE, Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington DC 2014, p. 315.
10 Countries and Regions. Syria, European Commission, Trade, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/pol-
icy/countries-and-regions/countries/syria/, [accessed: 28.11.2015].
11 N. Kozhanov, op. cit., p. 3. 
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The same is true regarding military contracts. For Damascus, and now espe-
cially for Bashar al-Assad, Russia remains a very important partner, providing not 
only arms and military equipment but also military advisers and technicians. “In 
2006 Moscow and Damascus signed a military contract for $4 billion; by 2010, 
this sum had allegedly increased to nearly $20 billion”12. According to Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report, Russia provided 48 percent 
of Syria’s imports during the 2006–2010 period, with air defence systems and 
anti-ship missiles making up the bulk of the deliveries13. Since the outbreak of 
the civil war in 2011 Russian-Syrian military cooperation has been maintained, 
however from 2015 it consists mainly of military advisors. 
It was September 2015 when news about increasing Russian military heavy 
equipment supplies to Syria (T-90 tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery 
systems and surface-to-air missiles) and a growing number of Russian military 
personnel there (between 1,700 and 2,000 individuals) spread around the world. 
The biggest change was the appearance at the airport in port city of Latakia (in 
north-western Syria) of around 30 combat aircraft (Su-24, Su-25, Su-30) and about 
a dozen ground-attack helicopters14.
The issue of the warm-water port in Tartus is also often mentioned in the 
context of Russia’s engagement in Syria. It was established in the 1970s for the 
Soviet Union’s 5th Mediterranean Squadron. It allows the Russian Black Fleet to 
deploy in the Mediterranean Sea, especially in its Eastern part. Recently, howev-
er, it represents mainly the importance of prestige and the argument for Russia’s 
great power status. According to some authors it can hardly be called a base. The 
importance of port facilities in Tartus increased after the Orange Revolution in 
Ukraine (2004). 
Summarizing, the economic and the military ties between Syria and Russia 
do not seem to be vital reasons for Moscow’s involvement in the Middle East. 
It is true that purchases of Russian arms by Syria are impressive, but for Rus-
sia Damascus is one of many foreign clients and not the most important one15. 
However, the delivery S-300 missiles seems like preventive action in the case of 
a western-led intervention in Syria or Israeli unilateral strikes. The presence of 
Russian S-300 (with a reputed range of 125 miles) raised the stakes and risks of 
efforts to impose a no-fly zone over Syria16.
12 Ibidem, p. 4.
13 P.D. Wezeman, Arms Transfer to Syria, in: SIPRI Yearbook 2013. Armaments, Disarma-
ment and International Security, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013, p. 269.
14 W. Rodkiewicz, “Russia’s game in Syria”, CES Analyses, 30.09.2015, http://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-09-30/russias-game-syria, [accessed: 22.11.2015].
15 See: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 2000-2014, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/ 
export_values.php [accessed 30.11.2015] and http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_
values.php [accessed 30.11.2015].
16 R. Allison, op. cit., p. 806.
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2.3. RUSSIAN AND ORTHODOx COMMUNITIES IN SYRIA
The numbers of Russians and Orthodox followers in Syria are exaggerated. 
The estimated number of Russians living in the country ranges from 100,000 to 
5,300. In January 2013 Sergei Lavrov claimed that there are several tens of thou-
sands of Russian citizens living in Syria17. The great part of them are represented 
by women who married Syrian men, some of them in Soviet times. During the 
Cold War there were 6,000 Soviet military advisers, technicians and civilian per-
sonnel in Syria. Thousands of Syrians studied at Soviet universities and military 
academies. Mixed Russian-Syrian marriages are one of the consequences of the 
latter. Although many of these people do not speak Russian, they have pro-Russian 
feelings. Nevertheless, only a small number decided to return to Russia. Only 
1,000 Russian passport holders have left for Russia since 201118. According to 
Russian authorities half of these Russians support the opposition. 
Christians (not only Orthodox) were quite numerous in Syria (Armenians, 
Assyrians and Chaldean Churches). After the outbreak of the civil war and the 
growing activity of “IS,” the situation of Christians became very hard. Russia 
as well as the Russian Orthodox Church stand up for Christians in Syria and 
the whole region. The argument for protection of Christians in Syria was one of 
Russia’s official reasons for its intervention. It allows Moscow to present itself 
as a protector of Christians and their traditions which, according to Russia’s au-
thorities and the Russian Orthodox Church, seem to be abandoned by secularized 
Western European states. 
3. DISTRUST BETWEEN PUTIN AND ASSAD
Vladimir Putin is the main creator of Russia’s foreign policy, including Mos-
cow’s involvement in Syria. He plays the “Syrian game” on the Assad’s side so far, 
nevertheless it seems he does not trust him. This is linked not only to the anarchic 
nature of international relations but also to earlier experiences of relations between 
Syria and Russia. Let’s point out two things. Firstly, when Vladimir Putin became 
the president of the Russian Federation in 2000, Assad was trying to improve 
cooperation with the European Union and not necessarily with Russia. Only after 
Assad’s European policy failed, did he decide to strengthen links with Moscow. 
It seemed for Putin as if Russia was only an alternative partner for Syria – not 
the best and not the most important one. Secondly, Putin did not forget Assad’s 
indolence regarding the Chechen rebels looking for shelter in Syria during both 
Chechen wars. It seems, therefore, that the Russian president supports Bashar 
al-Assad, not because of himself or because of loyalty to him. The late October 
17 Ibidem, p. 804.
18 Ibidem.
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2015 Assad visit in Moscow proceeded in a very frosty atmosphere. The crucial 
thing for Russia is not Assad, himself, but the Ba’ath regime, its institutions and 
armed forces. Right now this means Assad, and as for now he is still able to guar-
antee Russian interests in Syria. Depending on the cards at the negotiating table, 
Putin may sacrifice Assad for Russia’s winnings. 
The question that should be asked is: “What does Putin want to win in Syria, 
by supporting Assad?” It seems that he needs to a reach the solution that will not 
compromise Russia’s national interests and the opportunity to influence on the 
Syrian situation, which means stabilize the country and Syrian influence in the 
Middle East. For Moscow right now Assad remains a crucial factor in Syrian 
stabilization, because his removal may trigger the expansion of jihad and along 
with it destabilization into Russia and especially its Caucasian regions. 
4. THE MIDDLE EAST AS A PLAYGROUND  
FOR RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RIVALRY
Russian disappointment with the West resulted in its growing assertiveness 
and renewal of its position in neglected regions, including the Middle East. The 
evolution of Russia’s foreign policy in the mid-1990s should be linked with the 
above-mentioned Evgenii Primakov, who in 1996 became the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. The so-called Primakov doctrine assumed the need for restoration of 
Russia’s great power status. It should become one of the centres of “multipolar 
world”. This aim, according to Primakov, might be implemented by restoring 
Russia’s presence in regions where Moscow had been active. In this context Syria 
and Iran became important partners not only in the construction of “multipolar” 
international order but also in balancing the United States in both the Middle East 
and global levels.
It might be assumed that good relations with Damascus would improve Rus-
sia’s role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. If the relations between Israel and 
Syria became peaceful thanks to Russian mediation, its prestige and position in 
the Middle East would strengthen. It would, but this did not happen. The U.S. 
position in the region is still strong, just like Washington’s attempt in export de-
mocracy into the region. The Western efforts at regime change, which overthrows 
old leaders and provides instability, are perceived by Russia as unilateral rashness 
leading to destabilization of the Middle East, and further reduction of Russia’s 
political and economic influence in those countries.
It seems that by taking part in the civil war in Syria, Russia wants to teach 
the Americans several lessons. 
Firstly, the unilateral and irresponsible policy of regime change and democ-
racy promotion creates dangers and the destabilization of international relations. 
Secondly, breaking the international norms of non-interference in states’ internal 
affairs and outside military intervention in the name (theoretically) of human 
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rights brings more harm than good. The situation of Iraqi, Syrian and Libyan 
citizens, despite the many weaknesses of those countries, was better then than 
now. Thirdly, the protesters’ desire for foreign help to overthrow an undemocratic 
leader may trigger many civil wars. And fourthly, Russia can be a serious trouble 
maker, if its opinion is not taken into consideration19. The points suggested by 
Russia to the United States are:
− think twice before trying to change stable foreign regimes;
− undemocratic but stable regimes are sometimes in the interest of the West;
− successful regime change to democracy in countries where democracy 
has never been present takes a very long time (effective enforcing democracy is 
rather rare);
− the U.S. should always take Russia into consideration.
The Middle East is like a lens in which we can better see the differences in 
American and Russian perceptions of international relations and its core principles 
of state sovereignty, which seems sometimes crucial for Moscow, and human 
rights, which are sometimes more important for the U.S. and the West. The author 
of the article would like to stress that the principles that are argued by both always 
depend on their national interests. Thus, for Russia state sovereignty is not always 
a fundamental principle as we can see in 2008 in Georgia or in 2014 in Crimea. 
Similarly, the human rights principle is not fundamental for the U.S. in its relations 
with Saudi Arabia or China. On the other hand, the human rights argument was 
used instrumentally by Russia many times in its policy in the post-Soviet space.
Russia differs as well from the West in terms of its perception of the Arab 
Spring, which according to Moscow was not a “new 1989”. The Arab Spring 
protests were not spontaneous, but controlled from outside just like the “colour 
revolutions” in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004). They were engineered by 
the United States and western NGOs (just like protests in Russia in 2011 and in 
Ukraine during the Euromaidan in 2014. According to Moscow, the main goals 
of social movements in Georgia, Ukraine and in the Middle Eastern countries and 
for Western support of them, were not democracy and human rights. There were 
two main goals – first – a chance for regime change to more pro-Western ones 
and second, in the Middle East – to weaken the Shiite camp and especially its 
pillar – Iran (in Syria), and in the post-Soviet space – Russia’s influence. 
According to Moscow, the argument for human protection looks very dan-
gerous and instrumentalized by the West. It is used to implement its own political, 
economic and military interest and not necessarily the interests of citizens or states 
where the revolutions occurred. It is well known that president Vladimir Putin is 
very sensitive about the regime change. He is afraid that one day it may induce 
a Russian Spring. 
19 N. Kozhanov, op. cit., p. 16. See: I Krastev, “Is Vladimir Putin Trying to Teach the West 
a lesson in Syria?”, The New York Times, 07.10.2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/08/opinion/
ivan-krastev-is-putin-trying-to-teach-us-a-lesson.html?ref=opinion&_r=1 [accessed: 07.12.2015].
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5. GOALS OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SYRIA 
AFTER THE “ARAB SPRING”
After an official invitation from Syrian authorities, Russia sent warplanes 
to Syria and launched military operations on September 30, 2015. Unwilling to 
repeat the mistakes of the USSR in Afghanistan and the U.S. in Iraq, Russia is 
interested in a low-risk and low-budget operation20 that provides benefits that 
can be used in its internal and foreign policies. The Syrian campaign meets both 
requirements. According to the Moscow Times, Russian air strikes in Syria cost 
Moscow up to $4 million per day and $1,5 billion per year. This seems quite 
cheap, especially if we compare it with the U.S. spending in Iraq ($1,4 trillion)21. 
Theoretically, Russia decided to intervene in Syria after the invitation from pres-
ident Assad, so it was based on international law. Besides, according to official 
statements, Moscow is fighting jihadi terrorism, what puts the RF in a good light. 
However, Russian bombers targeted predominantly anti-Assad groups, rather than 
the “Islamic State” or other terrorist groups. 
Taking all the above into consideration we may identify several goals of 
Russia’s policy in Syria. The most important include:
− support its sole ally in the Arab World,
− limit American superpower status and restore Russia as the world power,
− stabilize the situation in the Middle East to help to maintain stability in 
the North Caucasus,
− break out of the international isolation caused by Russia’s aggression against 
Ukraine and improve relations with the United States and the European Union,
− make the Russians proud of their country again.
Victory by the pro-Assad camp is preferred by Russia for political and eco-
nomic reasons. It certainly will strengthen the Shi’a Crescent (Iran, Iraq, Syria 
and Lebanon) and thereby Russia’s influence in the Middle East. Remembering 
about fifty percent of the world’s oil reserves are located in this region, Russia is 
also trying to become an actor that cannot be ignored in potential future energy 
projects. The energy issues are truly important for Moscow, because more than 
sixty percent of its budget incomes originates from natural gas and oil exports. 
Because the Syrian war has already lasted for five years, the previously planned 
gas pipelines from Qatar or Iran via Syria to Europe is impossible. For Russia 
such a situation is beneficial, because it eliminates Middle Eastern competitors 
and maintains Russia’s domination in European energy supplies. 
The maintenance of friendly Syrian regime has political goals as well. If 
Assad’s regime remains, it will help Moscow to become an important interna-
20 P. Hobson, “Calculating the Cost of Russia’s War in Syria”, The Moscow Times, 20.10.2015, 
https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/calculating-the-cost-of-russias-war-in-syria-50382 [ac-
cessed: 10.08.2016].
21 M.J. Totten, op. cit., p. 7.
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tional actor again, one which is able to be active not only in the post-Soviet 
space but also in the Middle East. The eventual regime change in Syria may in 
turn result in someone who will not be as pro-Russian as Assad and the Ba’ath 
regime. This might result in the forced closure of Russia’s military bases at Tartus 
and Khmeimim (Latakia province). It could also result in cancelling the ongo-
ing projects like “the construction and export of two diesel-electric submarines, 
the modernization of the S-125 Neva anti-air-craft systems, the supply of fifty 
MiG-29 fighters and seventy-five IAK-30 training airplanes”22. Weakening the 
regime could also undermine Russia’s position in Syria and strengthen that of 
other states. If the Sunni opposition, which is backed by the U.S., France, Great 
Britain and by some Sunni Islamic states wins, those countries would strengthen 
their influence in Syria. 
As was mentioned above, being active in Syria is the a to strengthen Russia’s 
global status by rebuilding its influence in traditional regions of activity. Such 
a policy is also a part of balancing American influence in the Middle East, under-
mining Washington’s image as “good international policeman” and weakening 
its domination in international relations. Moscow is trying to present the West 
and especially the U.S. as a main culprit of the present destabilization in Syria 
and the Middle East. Simultaneously, it builds the positive image of Russia as an 
upholder of international law that opposes external interventions in the internal 
affairs of third countries and the main “cleaner of the mess” made by Washington. 
This was heard, for example, during Vladimir Putin’s speech at the UN General 
Assembly. Russian decision-makers try to present as well American weakness, 
inconsequence and inefficiency in its Middle Eastern policy. For example, in May 
2016 Sergei Lavrov again accused the Obama administration of supporting Al 
Qaeda in Syria. In addition, it seems that Russia learned some lesson from Libya 
(2011) and it does not want to repeat such a situation again. In 2011 Russia decided 
to abstain from voting on UN Security Council Resolutions 1971 and 1973, which 
allowed them to be adopted. Both resolutions condemned Muammar Qaddafi and 
imposed a no-fly zone over the country in order to protect civilians from regime 
forces. Although the aim of the resolutions was to protect the Libyan people from 
government forces, it turned into a military operation of regime change conducted 
by NATO. The alliance that had been appointed by the Security Council to protect 
Libyan civilians, illegally changed the provisions by itself, hereby NATO activity 
in Libya exceeded the mandate given by the UN. For Russia’s establishment, this 
evoked past NATO activity in Kosovo and again put Moscow in a where it was 
not treated as an equal partner of the West. This resentment influenced the Syrian 
case to a certain degree and Russia’s blocking any future UN resolution proposing 
military action against Assad. 
22 E. Barry, “As Nations Line Up Against Syrian Government, Russia Sides Firmly With”, 
The New York Times, 27.01.2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/28/world/europe/russia-sides-
firmly-with-assad-government-in-syria.html?_r=0 [accessed: 14.08.2016].
36 Agata Włodkowska-Bagan
It may be stated that Russia is for stabilization in Syria, which means support 
for the Ba’ath regime and its present leader, Bashar al-Assad. For Russia, Assad’s 
regime is the only political force that is currently able to fight against jihadi 
terrorism in Syria. If reminded that many of the foreign fighters in the ranks of 
“IS” come from Russia and the post-Soviet states, then Moscow’s involvement 
may be perceived as a preventive action to pin down and kill them before they 
come home23. On the other hand, it seems that Russia, similar to the Georgian and 
Ukrainian cases, does not really cares about a full resolution of the Syrian conflict. 
Better for Moscow is to freeze the conflict and maintain the status quo. This will 
help protect Russia’s strategic position in a divided Syria together with rejecting 
any enduring resolution and avoiding a long-lasting military engagement. 
Another important factor is that Russian involvement in the Syrian war gives 
it the opportunity to divert attention and resources away from the war in Ukraine 
and break its international isolation. It also provides a chance to sustain the wave 
of patriotic mobilization among Russians after the seizure of Crimea. Moreover, 
the increased political and economic costs of intervention in Ukraine result in 
growing dissatisfaction of Russian society and elites24. Consequently, changing 
the international discourse about Russia thanks to its intervention in Syria helps 
to some extent to make the Russians proud of their country and its leader. “Putin 
cannot rise Russian living standards to Western levels, but he can revive some 
of the motherland’s former glory”25. He not only retook Crimea, but also thanks 
to him Russia is important factor of international game in the Middle East again. 
It should be noticed that 68 percent of Russians support the Kremlin’s mil-
itary campaign in Syria26. According to Alexey Levinson of the Levada Center, 
this support “comes not from political discourse about the future of Syria, but 
from Russians’ personal support for Putin. Even when the President withdrew 
Russian troops and aviation from Syria, 81 percent supported him, while only 7 
percent said “no”, which indicates that everything Putin does is right, according 
to the population”27. 
23 D. Trenin, Putin’s Syria Gambit Aims at Something Bigger Than Syria, Op-Ed, Carnegie 
Moscow Center, October 13, 2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/10/13/putin-s-syria-gam-
bit-aims-at-something-bigger-than-syria/ikv3 [accessed: 14.08.2015].
24 P. Stronski, Russia’s Fight i Syria Reflects the Kremlin’s Fears at Home, Op-Ed, Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace, September 29, 2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/09/29/
russia-s-fight-in-syria-reflects-kremlin-s-fears-at-home/iibd [accessed: 02.12.2015].
25 M.J. Totten, “Moscow on the Tigris. Russia Joins the Terror Nexus”, World Affairs, Winter 
2016, p. 8.
26 Russian Participation in the Syrian Military Conflict, Levada-Center, 06.11.2015, http://
www.levada.ru/eng/russian-participation-syrian-military-conflict, [accessed: 10.12.2015].
27 P. Koshkin, “Why Russians approved Vladimir Putin’s gambit in Syria”, Russia Direct, 
11.05.2016, http://www.russia-direct.org/qa/why-russians-approved-vladimir-putins-gambit-syria 
[accessed: 08.08.2016].
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Figure 1. Russian public opinion on the Syrian conflict
Source: P. Koshkin, op. cit.
6. CONCLUSIONS
On March 14, 2016 Russia started the partial withdrawal of its military con-
tingent from Syrian territory. Despite the withdrawal, the bases in Tartus and 
Khmeymim will continue operating, meaning that Moscow will be ready at any 
time to send additional bombers and attack aircraft to Syria.
Russia’s presence helped to strengthen Bashar al-Assad and its role in the 
ongoing Syrian peace process. It helps as well to strengthen Russia in the region. 
However, the „Islamic State” may be still a source of danger for Russia, even 
after jihadist’s failure. Terrorists coming from Russia and the other post-Soviet 
countries will probably return home someday, and Russia may be pulled into 
a religious war and one of the targets of terrorist attacks.
Of the benefits of Russia’s activities in Syria, we may include its return 
to the Middle East as an important and influential player. The maintenance of 
Assad’s regime advanced the rapprochement with Iran, an even more important 
and valuable partner for Moscow. Both countries declare common interests and 
cooperation in Syria and can reach also other areas of collaboration. On the other 
hand, Russia’s Syrian campaign worsened relations with Turkey after it shot down 
a Russian SU-25 warplane in November 2015. After an apology from president 
Recep Erdogan in August of this year, Russian-Turkish relations are improving. 
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What about refugees? We cannot deny that Russia’s air strikes resulted in 
a growing number of refugees flowing to Europe and especially to EU member 
countries. To some extent, such a situation had positive consequences for Moscow. 
First of all, it weakened solidarity among EU member countries and increased 
the popularity of Russian-backed European far-right parties like the National 
Front in France. Reduction in the intensity of activities in Syria in turn creates 
an impression of Russia’s neutrality in the conflict and interest in stabilization. 
Besides, it helps to avoid the accusation of fuelling the immigration wave to 
Europe. Russia’s reduction of military involvement is intended to approach the 
West before a planned second round of the Syrian peace process and weaken EU 
sanctions on Russia after the aggression against Ukraine. 
And the last thing, thanks to Russian military involvement in Syria, the ef-
fectiveness of ongoing reform and modernization of the Russian army has been 
checked out, as have new weaponry and command systems in the battlefield area. 
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